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WHAT ELENA KAGAN COULD HAVE AND 
SHOULD HAVE SAID (AND STILL HAVE BEEN 
CONFIRMED) 
ERIC J. SEGALL

 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
From: Elena Kagan 
 
Re:  My Proposed Opening Statement for the Confirmation Hearing 
 
Date: June 2010 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Mr. President, below is the opening statement I plan on giving at my 
nomination hearing. 
 
Good morning, Senator Leahy, Senator Sessions, and the rest of the 
Judiciary Committee. It is a great honor to be here and to be nominated as 
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I am truly 
humbled by the proceedings today. 
I have two obligations here this week. First, of course, I would like to 
make my President proud and be confirmed as an Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, I would like to present to you and 
the American people a true and accurate picture of who I am and what I 
believe. Those two goals are not mutually inconsistent. 
Before this process turns to your direct questions for me, I feel that it is 
important to explain and put into context some of the previous remarks I 
have made about this nomination process. These comments have 
generated controversy over the last several weeks, and I feel I should 
address them.
1
 A few years ago, wearing an academic hat, I wrote that the 
process had become a “vapid and hollow charade,” and that “repetition of 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. This Commentary was presented at the 
Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2010 conference, and I appreciate the helpful comments I 
received during that conference. 
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platitudes ha[d] replaced discussion of viewpoints.”2 I concluded in that 
book review that the “hearings serve little educative function, except 
perhaps to reinforce lessons of cynicism that citizens often glean from 
government.”3 I would like to try to put a dent in that cynicism today. 
I will make three points at the outset, and then I will discuss each in 
more detail. First, I will answer your questions about my substantive views 
on specific constitutional questions fully, honestly, and directly. Second, I 
will offer a somewhat different view of the relationship between “law” and 
Supreme Court constitutional decisions than this committee has heard in 
the past. Third, I will explain why I think both the Senate and the 
American people deserve candor about my views on specific issues and 
are entitled to it in the future from all nominees to the highest Court in the 
land. 
I have spent my professional life discussing, thinking, and writing 
about hard legal questions, and I cannot pretend otherwise. As you know, I 
am a former Dean of Harvard Law School and have spent considerable 
time practicing law for the United States Government. Were I invited to an 
academic symposium on free speech, abortion rights, affirmative action, or 
gay marriage, I would have predispositions on those and other difficult 
issues. If you ask me questions about how I currently view these topics, I 
will do my best to answer them. I will not make any pledges or promises 
to decide any case in a specific way. Moreover, I must admit that I do not 
know how I will approach these issues as a judge if I am lucky enough to 
receive the nomination. But, I do not approach controversial constitutional 
law questions with a blank slate, and you and the American people have a 
right to know how I think. 
Some people believe that any disclosure of my views on specific 
questions would be inappropriate. I do not agree with that position. Let’s 
take, as an example, perhaps one of the most controversial issues this 
country faces. Assume that after much thought and reflection, I were to 
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment protects, to a certain degree, a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy (I would remind the committee 
this is just a hypothetical). I might even say that at this moment I think the 
Casey
4
 decision struck the right balance between the woman’s right and 
society’s interest in the life of the fetus and health of the mother. There is 
 
 
 2. Id. at 941. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that state and 
federal laws must not pose an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion) (plurality 
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).  
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no difference between setting forth that view in a law review article I 
might have written last week or last year and saying it to you here today. 
When presented with a real case about abortion and when forced to make a 
decision as a judge, I might, of course, come out differently, but there 
would be nothing improper about me disclosing to you today the truth 
about how I view this difficult issue. 
Ever since the Senate rejected Judge Bork, there has been the notion 
that nominees should not answer questions about their views on specific 
issues. And, candidly, I received that advice from many of my friends and 
colleagues before this hearing today. But I disagree. Judge Bork was not 
rejected because he answered questions truthfully. That is the wrong 
lesson to take from his confirmation process. He was rejected because, for 
better or worse, the Senate believed that his substantive views disqualified 
him from being a Justice. As I have written before, the hearings on Judge 
Bork “presented to the public a serious discussion of the meaning of the 
Constitution, the role of the Court, and the views of the nominee; that 
discussion at once educated the public and allowed it to determine whether 
the nominee would move the Court in the proper direction.”5 The Senate 
and the public have the right to make that determination. 
Senator Schumer, this is what you said during the confirmation 
hearings of Chief Justice Roberts, and it is as true today as it was then:  
It seems strange, I think, to the American people that you can't talk 
about decided cases, past cases, not future cases, when you have 
been nominated to the most important job in the Federal judiciary. 
You could do it when you worked in the White House. You could 
do it when you worked in the Justice Department. You could do it 
when you worked in private practice. You could do it when you 
gave speeches and lectures. As a sitting judge, you have done it 
until very recently. You could probably do it before you just walked 
into this hearing room. And if you are confirmed, you may be doing 
it for 30 years on the Supreme Court. But the only place and time 
that you cannot criticize any cases of the Supreme Court is in this 
hearing room when it is more important than at any other time that 
the American people and we, the Senators, understand your views. 
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 Why this room should be some kind of a cone of silence is 
beyond me. The door outside this room does not say, “Check your 
views at the door.”6 
Senator Schumer, you were right then, and you would be right today to 
require me to answer such questions. In that vein, I look forward to a 
robust and profound conversation about the meaning of our Constitution 
and how it applies to specific cases. 
The second point I want to talk about is related to the first in the sense 
that some have suggested that a nominee’s personal views are largely 
irrelevant to the nomination hearings because it is the “law” that matters 
when the Court reaches decisions. Those who hold that view believe that a 
Justice’s job is to apply the law to the facts before her and that a Justice’s 
personal values and beliefs don’t play a large role in the decision-making 
process.  
In my role as an academic and as a lawyer, I have come to a different 
conclusion on these questions. Because of the vagueness of many of the 
important provisions of our Constitution, because history is often unclear, 
and because the Supreme Court has a clear practice of overturning 
important constitutional decisions, the “law” often runs out in difficult 
constitutional cases. At that point, a Justice has no choice but to bring her 
personal values, experiences, and judgments to the process. The law, 
alone, is simply not enough to decide these cases. Let me be clear, 
however, that the fact that personal judgment matters is not the same thing 
as saying that I will legislate from the bench. I will try to apply the law the 
best way that I can. But in constitutional cases, the law often leaves the 
Justices with significant discretion. 
One way to illustrate this point is to rely on a hypothetical (after all, I 
am a former law professor) from my article on the nomination process to 
which I referred earlier. Imagine your response if President Obama had 
announced that he was going to choose his nominee to the Supreme Court 
by conducting a lottery among Richard Posner, Janet Reno, and Laurence 
Tribe because they seemed to him to be the nation's three smartest 
lawyers. Rather obviously, the implications for constitutional law of 
confirming each of them would be quite different, and that is not because 
they are, in some sense, “better or worse” than each other at legal 
interpretation. No, the differences that would emerge result not from 
 
 
 6. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 375 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).  
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varying legal skills but because those three people have different values 
and life experiences. Thus, it seems to me that you and the American 
people have the right to discover my values and my perspectives to the 
extent that they shape my views on specific constitutional questions, and I 
will be happy to share them with you. 
Let me finish this last point by discussing the famous umpire analogy 
that Chief Justice Roberts used during his confirmation hearing. Here is 
exactly what he said: 
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way 
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they 
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They 
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. 
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.  
 Judges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate 
within a system of precedent shaped by other judges equally 
striving to live up to the judicial oath, and judges have to have the 
modesty to be open in the decisional process to the considered 
views of their colleagues on the bench. 
 . . . . 
 . . . I will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and 
not to pitch or bat.
7
 
Although this umpire analogy has been criticized by many in legal 
academia and the press, I think it can be helpful to a proper understanding 
of the role of the Court. Umpires, like Justices, are not at liberty to change 
the rules. Even if an umpire doesn’t agree with the infield fly rule or the 
fact that after four balls the hitter gets to go to first base, he must 
nevertheless enforce those rules. Similarly, Supreme Court Justices are not 
at liberty to simply set aside constitutional rules they don’t like. However, 
to suggest that individual discretion plays only a minor role in how an 
umpire or a judge does his job is to fail to illuminate these roles. An 
umpire has significant discretion, for example, to decide whether to eject 
from the game a manager or player who argues too much with a call, and 
an umpire’s decision as to whether a particular pitch is a ball or strike is 
fraught with discretion and is unreviewable. Similarly, the decision as to 
whether a particular law violates the freedom of speech, whether a search 
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is unreasonable, or whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual 
also calls for the application of personal judgment and discretion. That is 
why brilliant judges like Justices Scalia and Ginsburg disagree over major 
constitutional questions. On gun control, abortion, affirmative action, 
campaign finance reform, and the separation of church and state, these two 
Justices come to different conclusions. That disagreement results much 
more from their different perspectives, values, and life experiences than a 
difference in legal or interpretive skills.  
For all of these reasons, if you ask me questions about my values, my 
perspectives, and my life experiences as they relate to the job I am being 
nominated to perform, I will answer them honestly, directly, and to the 
best of my abilities. 
Finally, I would like to offer a few thoughts to those of you who are 
concerned that my perspective on this nomination process and the Court 
poses a threat to you should you vote to confirm me. I believe the 
American people understand that the job of being a Supreme Court Justice 
requires more than legal skills, and they understand very well that difficult 
constitutional questions cannot be answered by simply applying clear law 
to undisputed facts. They know that judges are not computers who can 
come up with objectively right answers. I believe that the legal 
commentators for CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and the networks also 
understand this very well. You and your constituencies may disagree with 
me on specific legal questions, and if you disagree with me enough, 
perhaps you should vote against my confirmation. But I sincerely believe 
that no one will hold against me the fact that I will tell the truth about my 
views and that I will be candid as to what issues I have strong feelings 
about and which issues I do not have strong feelings about. As I wrote 
fifteen years ago: 
[T]he Senate's confirmation hearings[] ought to focus on substantive 
issues; the Senate ought to view the hearings as an opportunity to 
gain knowledge and promote public understanding of what the 
nominee believes the Court should do and how she would affect its 
conduct. Like other kinds of legislative fact-finding, this inquiry 
serves both to educate members of the Senate and public and to 
enhance their ability to make reasoned choices. Open exploration of 
the nominee's substantive views, that is, enables senators and their 
constituents to engage in a focused discussion of constitutional 
values, to ascertain the values held by the nominee, and to evaluate 
whether the nominee possesses the values that the Supreme Court 
most urgently requires. These are the issues of greatest consequence 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/6
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surrounding any Supreme Court nomination (not the objective 
qualifications of the nominee); and the process used in the Senate to 
serve the intertwined aims of education and evaluation ought to 
reflect what most greatly matters.
8
 
So, to conclude my remarks, let me say that I promise to bring an open 
mind to all the cases before me. I will never decide a case because of the 
identity of the parties or any relationship I have with any of the parties, 
and I will do my best to ascertain the relevant law in every case. But, to 
pretend that I do not hold views on the disputed constitutional issues of 
our day, or that those views will be irrelevant to my decision making, or 
that the United States Senate and the American people are not entitled to 
an understanding of those views, is something I simply cannot do. I truly 
hope that belief does not disqualify me from being an Associate Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 8. Kagan, supra note 1, at 935. 
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